Abstract: Despite Paraguay being one of the largest net exporters of electricity in the world (for decades and the main electricity exporter in South America accounting for 85% of all exports), it is the second poorest nation in South America after Bolivia. It is the half owner of the 14,000MW Itaipu hydro electric complex. Paraguay gets a small fraction of the market price for the exported electricity to Brazil. The Brazilians viewpoint is that the spirit of the treaty is to recover the investment cost and not the commercial price. Hence, there is widespread discontent among the Paraguayans. One Paraguayan minister has commented that it is a real politik of an ant staring at an elephant.
Itaipu Hydro Plant
The 14,000MW Itaipu Hydropower Plant had been the largest hydropower station in the world until the completion of Three Gorges (22,500MW) hydro station in China. In terms of annual power production, however, Itaipu led Three Gorges in 2008 and 2009. The Itaipu plant generates about 92TWh/year, supplies 80% of the electricity consumed by Paraguay and 19% of that consumed by Brazil. In 1994, Itaipu Dam was named as one of the seven modern wonders of the world by American Society of Civil Engineers. It is the combined project of Paraguay and Brazil constructed over the border river Parana.
Itaipu Binacional is the owner of the hydro plant, which is jointly administered by Paraguay and Brazil. The treaty signed in April 1973 resulted the Itaipu Power Plant. The financial conditions of the treaty will expire in 2023.
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As per the treaty, the excess electricity of Paraguay side is required to be sold to Brazil through its main state owned subsidiary Eletrobas. At the time of the treaty, there were military governments in both Brazil and Paraguay. The project cost was estimated to be US$2 billion in 1973 but escalated to $20 billion when completed in 1991.
Paraguay and Brazil are two legally bound equal partners in Itaipu Binacional, having 50% each of the benefits of the Itaipu even though they are two asymmetrical nations in terms of population and economy size.
Paraguay and Brazil each invested 50 million US dollars initially; the rest coming from loans.
For Itaipu, the main creditor for this debt is Eletrobas, the main state owned (more than 50%) Brazilian company and main Itaipu Electricity buyer (94% in 2011). This Itaipu Binacional entity was constituted by ANDE (Paraguay) and ELETROBRAS (Brazil). hydro station at Itaipu, Paraguay is still the second poorest nation in South America after Bolivia. Agriculture, agribusiness, cattle ranching and electricity export are the main economic activities of Paraguay. The economy has grown due to increased exports of soybeans and beef, and it is the third largest net exporter of electricity in the world.
Paraguay uses electricity for only 15% of its total energy needs. The per capita electricity consumption per annum is 1,300kWh (ANDE). More than 90% of population has access to electricity, but in a very precarious way.
Tariffs
The revenue/compensation received for the electricity sold to Brazil (from Paraguay's share in Itaipu) and also to Argentina to some extent (from its share in Yacyretá ) is very low. Brazil insists that as per the treaty the price of the exported electricity is based on the recovery of the investment cost plus a non market profit and not the commercial price. The Paraguayan profit for the electricity export to Brazil (compensation) has remained very low.
2 In 2006, Paraguay earned $373.6 million from the Itaipu dam, of which $196.5 million was royalties and $87.3 million was compensation/profit for energy sold to Brazil's state-run power utilities. The price paid to
Yacyretá Hydro Plant
Another Hydropower project, Yacyretá, of 3100MW, is located downside of Itaipu and was developed jointly with the Argentine government. It is also not very productive to Paraguayans. It is a low head plant with a head of 22m. Only after decades of plant operation, the project is now operated at designed capacity. There have been substantial cost and time overruns and the investigation and feasibility of the project were not carried out in sufficient detail. Nor were environmental concerns given due importance. Due to submergence of the populated areas, the designed reservoir level of 83m was not reached until February 2011. Since 1994 the turbines were running below the rated capacity due to less than designed reservoir water level. The project is criticized for not taking consideration of the ecology and environment during planning and construction. Due to the reservoir created by the dam, a large numbers of species are assumed extinct. In early 2010 the reservoir level was only 78.5 meters above sea level allowing output of only 65% of the plant's 3,100MW installed capacity. Yacyretá currently supplies around 14% of Argentina's electricity consumption.
Both countries invested US$50 million each and the rest came as loan. The annual revenue at full production of $800 million is not sufficient to service the annual interest of $950 million on the huge $12 billion debt by 2009 (Nickson 2010) . The Argentinean President Carlos Menem characterized Yacyretá as a "monument to corruption" on its huge cost. Due to two decades of construction period (due to several years of work stoppages) and legal aspects, Paraguay argues that much of this debt is 'spurious'. Paraguay is demanding that the debt will be no more than 5 billion dollars and that the rest should be written off. In 2009, Paraguay received $140 million from the plant for its share of electricity sold to Argentina. 
A Land Locked Country

Discontent of Paraguayans
There is wide discontent in Paraguay regarding the dismal price paid by the Brazil. Paraguay demands market price whereas Brazil reiterates that the spirit of the treaty is to recover the investment. This is a treaty between two neighboring nations who are legally equal but politically and economically unequal. President Fernando Lugo of Paraguay during his election campaign stated that his main agenda was to renegotiate with Brazil to get a fair price for its exported electricity. For a long time, Brazil refused to increase the price of the Paraguayan electricity, nor did it allow the sale of electricity other than through the designated agency.
Despite the legal obligation for 'alternating directorships', ever since the project came on line in the mid-1980s, the finance and technical directorships of the bi-national hydro company, Itaipu Binacional, have remained exclusively in Brazilian hands and the Paraguayan National Audit Office has not been allowed to examine the company accounts (Nickson 2010) . Only recently have Paraguayan auditors been allowed to see the accounts for the Itaipu debt.
Brazil clearly has the upper hand in the matter, including a military that regularly practices seizing and locking down the dam, and the expertise and financing required to run the dam (Stratfor 2009 There is US$16.5 billion debt (at end of 2010) owed on Itaipu, half of which is on Paraguay's account. Paraguay claims that this debt is illegal, as the amount is much higher than originally agreed upon in the treaty.
Paraguay lacks infrastructures like sufficient transmission lines to dispatch electricity in the various parts of the country. Further, it has not been able to attract foreign direct investment to open energy-hungry industries in the country. Only in January 2009, President Lugo signed a decree introducing special tariff rates for energy-intensive industries. Rio Tinto Alcan, an aluminum industry giant, intends to invest in Paraguay, but there is no tariff agreement yet. The Paraguayan government says that the investment is welcome if there is not an under cost electricity tariff needed. The proposed industry will cost US$2.5 billion and will consume 800MW of power.
Paraguay needs to initiate the consumption of a large amount of electricity inside the country by establishing industries, laying lines of electrically run railways, trolley buses or electrical battery operated vehicles, to consume large amounts of electricity.
Brazilian View Point
Brazilians are unhappy being portrayed as profiteers. The Brazilian government provided the collateral for the loan to Paraguay, but Brazilians believe that their financial and technical contributions have been forgotten.
Itaipu supplies about 19% of the electricity to Brazil; hence, it has high strategic importance to Brazil. The inequitable arrangement of Itaipu is of enormous economic advantage to Brazil. Brazil is emerging as a geopolitical power in South America and intends to put its point of view in global matters.
Lessons for Nepal or a Small country
Many people in Nepal, especially at the policy level, see Nepal becoming rich by exporting electricity. Further, Nepal's politicians are mesmerized by the benefits of electricity export from half share of the proposed 6,480MW Pancheshwar High Dam along the border river between India and Nepal. Nepal is entitled to half of the electricity generated. The export of about 38 million MWh of electricity annually of Paraguay from Itaipu is similar to the Nepal's proposed 10,800MW Karnali project, half share of the proposed 6,480MW Pancheshawer, and the proposed 3,000MW Koshi project. Based on the scenario and lessons from Paraguay, it is necessary that Nepal be vigilant in future deals with India. Most Nepalese believe that it has a history of not getting a fair deal with India in its treaties/agreement in water resources projects on the rivers Koshi, Gandak and Mahakali. In the present situation, the government of India has designated the Power Trading Corporation of India as the single nodal agency through which all Nepal-India power transactions need to be routed.
S.B. Pun, in a 2010 article in HYDRO Nepal stated that Paraguay landed in the proverbial frying pan for the exported electricity. Pun cautions that Nepal may also land in the same frying pan as the Paraguayan did, unless the Nepalese understand the intricacies of the treaty and negotiations. For this, Nepal needs to strengthen its institutions to be capable of negotiating for a fair share of benefits.
Conclusion
The 14,000MW Itaipu Hydroelectric Complex is a technically and financially successful project producing cheap and reliable electric power. However, as the half owner of Itaipu, the revenues (profits) received by Paraguay from the sale of electricity to Brazil are dismal compared to market prices. Paraguay has failed hopelessly to get a fair price for the exported electricity. The terms of the treaty with Brazil are not favorable to Paraguay. Furthermore, the agreed terms are not implemented and Brazil retains the upper hand. It is a sense of the "real politik of an ant staring at an elephant" as visualized by a Paraguayan minister. Only 36 years after the Itaipu Treaty was signed, were improvements incorporated in the treaty terms. Since 2011, Paraguay will receive three times more revenue than in the past for its electricity export to Brazil; but it is not yet at market price.
Further, Paraguay is not getting reasonable benefit from the Yacyretá (3100MW) Hydro Electric Plant, which was constructed jointly with neighboring Argentina. There were massive time and cost overruns in the two decades of construction period. This project has also been criticized for not taking environmental and ecological considerations.
The following are the lessons from Paraguay: 1. Paraguay needs to learn a lesson to consume electricity as much as possible in energy hungry industries, homes, transportation, etc., instead of exports. Further, a treaty/agreement needs to include a clause for a freedom to export surplus electricity. 2. A small country needs to be careful in drafting treaties/agreements because of the difficulty in changing them later. This is a lesson to be remembered for a small least developed country eyeing joint exploitation of their mega water resources with a big neighbor. For example, it took 36 years to change some terms of the Itaipu Treaty. 3. Each of the massive projects, Itaipu and Yacyretá, were started with only US$50 million from each country as equity and the rest as loans. This implies that generally accepted 30% equity (to be invested by the developer/company) standard in Nepal for hydro projects may be substantially lowered, thus increasing the financial viability of the project. 
